

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Supporting Links
SUPPORT SB 5464 ESTABLISHING THE WASHINGTON
INVESTMENT TRUST

10
11
12
13
14

1. Lines 10, 17, 20:

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

1a. Brown, Ellen Hodgson. *From Austerity to Prosperity: The Public Bank Solution*. Baton Rouge: Third Millennium Press, 2013.

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

"Few depositors realize it but the bank legally owns their money as soon as it is deposited in the bank. The money becomes the bank's and the depositor becomes an unsecured creditor holding an IOU or a promise to pay. That has been the law for over a century ...

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Derivative claims have 'super priority' in bankruptcy, meaning they are first in line to grab assets; and they could squeeze out not only the depositors but the FDIC itself. (The bankruptcy Reform Act 2005. gives priority over depositors to derivative claims, including those deposits insured by FDIC) How secure is the FDIC? Its insurance fund is mandated by law to keep a balance equivalent to only 1.15% of its insured deposits. As of March 2013, it had only about \$25 billion in its deposit insurance fund as against \$9.2 trillion in total US deposits.

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Two mega banks (JP Morgan Chase and Bank of America) hold more in notional derivatives than the entire global GDP.

The giant international banks are considered simply too big to fail, even if it means that depositor funds must be confiscated to keep them alive." pp. 336 – 342

2. Lines 14-15:

Stacie Prada, Jefferson County Treasurer, in a telephone interview on Monday, February 6, 2017 with Carol Gallup, Democratic Party member: "We pay a transaction fee, called an analysis fee, for every banking transaction. We used to bank with Bank of America. We paid \$2,400 to \$2,800 a month, depending on the number of transactions in that month. BofA sold our account, along with their branch, to a local bank, First Security Bank of Washington. Now we pay about one-third of what we paid before in transaction fees. We also have an account with USB in Quilcene, and some CDs with small banks." Treasury office, County Courthouse, (360) 385-9150

3. Line 17, 20:

3a. Plan to Bail Out 'Too Big to Fail' Banks Raises Skepticism
Stephen J. Lubben, October 24, 2016

The basic model involves the holding company issuing a lot of debt that is used to fund the operating subsidiaries. Because these new funds come in the form of long-term bonds, they cannot be subject to a run like bank deposits in the 1930s or repo or

50 commercial paper in 2008. These bonds, called total loss absorbing capacity, would
51 be exchanged for shares in the financial institution. Old shareholders would be wiped
52 out.

53
54 <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/25/business/dealbook/plan-to-bail-out-too-big-to-fail-banks-raises-skepticism.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FFederal%20Deposit%20Insurance%20Corporation>

58
59 **3b. Regulators Warn 5 Top Banks They Are Still Too Big to Fail**
60 **Nathaniel Popper and Peter Eavis, April 13, 2016**

61
62 "The Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation said on
63 Wednesday that five of the nation's eight largest banks — including JPMorgan
64 Chase and Bank of America — did not have "credible" plans for how they would
65 wind themselves down in a crisis without sowing panic.

66
67 That suggests that if there were another crisis today, the government would need to
68 prop up the largest banks if it wanted to avoid financial chaos."

69
70 <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/business/dealbook/living-wills-of-5-banks-fail-to-pass-muster.html>

71
72
73 **3c. Morning Agenda: Five Banks Seen as Too Big to Fail**
74 **Sei Chong, April 14, 2016**

75
76 FIVE BANKS SEEN AS TOO BIG TO FAIL | Nearly eight years after the financial
77 crisis, five of the largest American banks are still seen as too big to fail, Nathaniel
78 Popper and Peter Eavis write in DealBook. The Federal Reserve and the Federal
79 Deposit Insurance Corporation determined that JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America,
80 Wells Fargo, State Street and Bank of New York Mellon submitted plans for
81 insolvency, also known as living wills, that were "not credible or would not facilitate
82 an orderly resolution under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code." Goldman Sachs and Morgan
83 Stanley received passing grades from only one of the two agencies.

84
85 <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/business/dealbook/living-wills-of-5-banks-fail-to-pass-muster.htmlhttps://news.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/morning-agenda-five-banks-seen-as-too-big-to-fail/?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FFederal%20Deposit%20Insurance%20Corporation>

86
87
88
89
90
91 **3d. Banks Still Too Big to Regulate**
92 **The New York Times Editorial Board, April 14, 2016**

93
94 Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation rejected the plans of
95 Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, JPMorgan Chase, State Street and
96 Wells Fargo.

97
98 <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/opinion/banks-still-too-big-to->

99 [regulate.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FFederal%20Deposit%20Insurance%
100 20Corporation](http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/regulate.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FFederal%20Deposit%20Insurance%20Corporation)

101
102 **4. Line 17**

103 **More Evidence of Undercapitalization/Insolvency of Major Banks**
104 **Yves Smith, Posted January 21, 2011**

105
106 Paying dividends helps banks maintain excessive leverage. A typical bank funds
107 over 95 per cent of its investments with debt and less than 5 per cent with equity. A
108 small drop in asset values can lead to distress and possible insolvency. We have seen
109 that furious “deleveraging” by any highly leveraged and interconnected bank can
110 start a crisis...

111
112 The Basel III reforms agreed last year set minimum bank equity between 4.5 per cent
113 and 7 per cent of “risk-weighted assets”, which are significantly smaller than total
114 assets for most banks. Triple A-rated assets require little or no equity capital. The
115 system of risk weights established by Basel II, which distorts banks’ investments
116 towards favourably treated assets, was mostly maintained. Under Basel III, the ratio
117 of equity to total assets can be as low as 3 per cent.

118
119 These equity requirements are dangerously low. Significantly increasing banks’
120 equity funding would provide many benefits to the economy, at little social cost.
121 ...the capital ratios mean nothing if the assets are overvalued.

122
123 [http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/01/more-evidence-of-
125 undercapitalizationinsolvency-of-major-banks.html](http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/01/more-evidence-of-
124 undercapitalizationinsolvency-of-major-banks.html)

126 **5. Lines 23, 26**

127
128 **Brown, Ellen Hodgson. *From Austerity to Prosperity: The Public Bank Solution.***
129 **Baton Rouge: Third Millennium Press, 2013.**

130
131 **5a.** [In cases where a state bank is the lender] For the state, infrastructure projects are
132 effectively interest-free, since the bank returns interest to the state in the form of an
133 annual dividend. The result is to reduce project costs by an average of 40% over the
134 life of the loan. p. 365 (See also: Chapter 1).

135
136 **5b.** In April, 2011, the BND (Bk of N Dakota) reported annual profits of \$62 million,
137 setting a record for the 7th straight year. The profits belong to the citizens and they
138 are generated without taxation." (Note: The 7 record years prior to 2011 included the
139 meltdown years of 2007-2008 that destroyed the economy of the rest of the country.)
140 p. 365

141
142 **Supporters of this Resolution**

143
144 Lauri Chambers, lauriannchambers@gmail.com, (360) 385-7364
145 Julia Cochrane, willowtree@olypen.com, (360) 821-1926
146 James A. Hackman, oak@olypen.com (360) 385-3002
147 Wilma L. Hackman, oak@olypen.com (360) 385-3002

148 Raul Huerta, capeg15@gmail.com, (315) 247-0702
149 Cynthia Koan, cynthia.koan@gmail.com (360) 385-7397
150 Nate Malmgren, nate@socialarter.com, (210) 954-7245
151 Ryan Mc Allister, rtmcallister@yahoo.com, (360) 301-1795
152 Victoria Mc Allister, vicky-mcallister@hotmail.com, (360) 301-1901
153 Tom Meyer, tmeyer@craniosacral-lmp.com, (360) 301-1663
154 Dayna Neely, dayna.en@gmail.com, (360) 643-1463
155 Juliet Parfrey, julietparfrey@gmail.com, (360) 531-4883
156 Matt Sircely, mattsircely@gmail.com, (360) 385-2910